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Nuclear energy over a 
30-year scenario
Introduction
An analysis of the future of nuclear energy over a 30-year time frame must comprise at least the following aspects: electricity demand and the comparative environmental, technological and strategic costs 
(including national reserves and non-proliferation).
The comprehensive nature of these aspects requires a concise 
treatment and referral to previous works, as it is done here.
Electricity Demand
In Brazil, within our time frame, the justiﬁable peaceful application of 
a nuclear program is the generation of electrical energy. The share of nuclear-
generated electricity depends on the country’s energy requirements, which, 
in turn, are a function of economic growth and the available alternatives.
The ill-conceived estimates of economic growth were the weak link 
in energy planning from the 1970’s to the 1990’s. Successive overestimates 
of economic growth and of the corresponding demand for electrical energy 
led to a general disbelief regarding the threat of shortages in the supply of 
electricity. This was one of the causes of the laxness of energy plans, which 
caused the undersupply that led to the extensive blackout of 2001.
These difﬁculties motivated the members of the OSCIP e&e team 
(Public Interest Civil Social Organization – Economy & Energy) to study 
the restraints on Brazilian growth and identify the chief limitation: the 
reduction of capital productivity in the 1970’s and 1980’s that curbed the 
country’s future growth. These difﬁculties have only increased since 1994 
due to the high interest rates applied to control inﬂation. The result was 
a decrease in the rate of internal savings that was not offset by the entry 
of foreign savings, as was expected. The net result of the loss of capital 
productivity was a plummeting investment rate and the inability to generate 
the desired economic growth.
Energy planning, practically abandoned in the 1990’s, was resumed in 
President Lula’s ﬁrst mandate with basic premises of growth below what the 
government desired. The 2030 Plan assumed that the GDP would grow by 
4% per year (2005-2025), or the equivalent of 3.2% GDP growth per capita.
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We will examine here three assessments of electricity demand, all of 
them with basically coincidental GDP projections: e&e (Alvim et al, 2007), 
EPE (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética) in “National 2020 Plan: Supply 
Expansion Strategy”, and the results of the “Agenda Elétrica Brasileira” 
published under the auspices of WWF-Brasil (Worldwide Fund for Nature) 
– Sustainable Electricity Agenda 2020.
Our methodology and the results we obtained are described below.
Methodology and comparison of results
The methodology used by e&e to project energy requirement is 
analogous to the one that, quite successfully, has been predicting Brazilian 
growth over the last ten years. Its general traits are:
1 Studying energy and economic variables (and their relationship) 
with stable and predictable behavior over their time frame, 
determining the best arrangement to describe the future by means 
of curves that usually stabilize at their maximum value.
2 Using data from more developed countries and from Brazilian 
hydraulic potential to choose the reference and saturation values, 
whenever applicable.
3 Seeking of best adjustment between the country’s historical data 
and the adopted reference value.
It should be noted that simply applying the best adjustment in (1) 
would generate deterministic values. However, the aim of this methodology 
and of the corresponding computer program is, on the contrary, to achieve 
consensus regarding the more probable scenario without the rigidity of 
pre-established relationships. The GDP used in the projections comes from 
applying the projetar_e semi-empirical macroeconomic model, the results of 
which are automatically reﬂected in the demand of energy.
The GDP is then correlated with the demand for equivalent energy, 
whereby the energy efﬁciency in each sector is used to determine the 
equivalence with a reference fuel of choice. The energy projection is based on 
the equivalent energy/GDP ratio, which has shown predictable behavior over 
the 35 years for which there are data available in the Balanço Energético e 
das Contas Nacionais (Energy Balance and National Accounts).a As shown in 
Figure 1, this ratio has slowly increased over the years, but reveals a tendency 
to saturate over time.
The best adjustment of past data projects 0.513 koe [kilogram of 
oil equivalent]/dollar (2003) for 2030, whereas the value actually adopted 
leads to 0.491 koe/dollar (2003) – or 4.3% lower. It should be noted that 
the program limits the adjustment freedom by comparing the projection 
with historical behavior and by suggesting limits deﬁned by other countries’ 
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experience. As a result, the values established by the consensus groups 
usually do not diverge much from the historical trend.
Figure 1. Illustration of the methodology used to project demand in 
equivalent energy as a function of GDP (in 2003 US dollars), both 
under the best adjustment hypothesis and by imposing the limit of 
(countries with) less energy-intensive countries (Western European 
countries and Japan).
Figure 2. Share of electric energy in equivalent energy.
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The program then projects the share of electric energy in the total 
(expressed in equivalent energy). The result is shown in Figure 2.
One inconvenience of working only with the best adjustment is 
that circumstances (such as the 2001 blackout) can alter the short-, and 
sometimes middle-range trends, and change the best adjustment by 
introducing new years in the series. Figure 2 shows a case in which, after 
a moment of transition around 2000, the behavior of the curve almost 
returned to the previous value.
If we adopt the GDP growth hypothesis previously mentioned, this 
methodology results in the e&e projections shown in Table 1, which also 
includes the results from EPE and WWF, and a revision of the e&e study 
that assumes the electric energy/GDP ratio will evolve consistently with the 
conservation of energy hypotheses adopted by EPE.
Table 1. Comparison of results: e&e (original and revised), EPE and WWF.
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
GDP e&e (2000=100) 100 111 129 158 200 256 335 444
GDP ePe (2000=100) 100 111 137 168 195 239 303
Electric e&ea TWh* 332 375 451 576 743 966 1,280 1,710
Electric e&er TWh 332 375 441 544 695 900 1,188 1,582
Electric EPE TWh 321 388 471 575 703 859 1,046
Electric WWF TWh 388 500
Growth rates 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2005 2005
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2020 2030
GDP e&e % year 2.2% 3.0% 4.2% 4.7% 5.1% 5.6% 4.0% 4.5%
GDP EPE % year 2.2% 4.2% 4.2% 3.0% 4.2% 4.9% 3.8% 4.1%
Electric e&ea % year 2.5% 3.7% 5.0% 5.2% 5.4% 5.8% 4.7% 5.0%
Electric e&er % year 2.5% 3.3% 4.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.7% 4.2% 4.7%
Electric EPE % year 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0%
Electric WWF % year 1.7%
e&ea = original values; e&er = revised values; * TWh = terawatts/hour
A supplementary way to test the consistency of projections is to 
study the energy intensity per GDP unit as a ratio of GDP per capita in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The United States’ EIA/DOE (Energy 
Information Administration/Department of Energy) Web site contains 
data on energy intensity for the consumption of primary and electric 
energy for practically every country or geographical unit. The adjustment 
comprises the approximately 200 countries and geographical units 
registered at the United Nations and shows strong correlation. When 
the whole is limited to countries with population over 10 million, the 
adjustment is improved, as can be seen in Figure 3. The slope of the line of 
adjustment remains practically the same.
It should be noted that, for each country, the energy/inhabitant 
and GDP/inhabitant curves are only representations (on a different scale) 
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of the energy x GDP curve. However, by representing several countries, it 
is possible to compare data from countries in different stages of economic 
growth and take into account the economic growth of each one.
Figure 3. Electric energy/GDP for countries with population over 
    10 million. (Some countries indicated.)
With the variation of the GDP/inhabitant ratio, the behavior of 
the energy/inhabitant ratio can also be observed for individual countries 
or groups of countries. There were no signiﬁcant variations for groups 
of countries between 1990 and 2004. The dynamic behavior of the two 
variables of intensity surveyed (electricity per GDP and per inhabitant) 
can be drawn on a graph, where the projected data are also represented.b
Extrapolated for Brazil, the numbers would continue below the world trend 
for 2004 (which coincides with that of 1990).c Figure 4 shows two GDP 
scales: actual (in 2000 dollars) and in purchasing power parityd.
Figure 5 shows the ratio of electricity consumption/GDP (PPP) per 
GDP/inhabitant according to the projections of E&E, EPE and WWF.
The results of the survey sponsored by WWF, which included the 
participation of many respected entities involved in energy conservation or 
alternative energies, are incongruous with of those of the other two studies, 
and there was some public controversy between its authors and those of the 
EPE survey.
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Electricity Consumption and GDP (PPP) per capita in Brazil 
Compared with Adjusted Value for 198 Countries 
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Figure 4. Evolution of the electric energy/inhabitant and GDP/inhabitant 
  ratios according to the e&e projections. The numbers corresponding 
  to the real GDP in 2000 dollars are only approximations.
Figure 5. Projections of the ratio electricity/inhabitant compared 
     with world trends.
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It should be noted that the time frame of each projection is different: 
e&e’s is 2035, EPE’s is 2030 and WWF’s is 2020. The e&e’s projection 
begins below the current world standard and gradually departs from it; 
EPE’s departs somewhat more from this standard, while WWF’s completely 
diverges from it, assuming strong GDP/inhabitant growth while maintaining 
per capita consumption of electricity almost constant.
Figure 6 is interesting, as it compares the behavior of the variable 
electricity consumption/GDP projected by the aforementioned studies.
This comparison reveals that EPE’s projection essentially maintains 
the ratio electricity/GDP of the last years of the series, whereas e&e’s admits 
the continuation of a moderate increase in the intensity of electricity usage 
and a tendency toward saturation after 2035. WWF’s value for 2020 is 14% 
lower than the same value in the 2001 blackout.
Figure 6: Electricity consumption/GDP in the three studies.
It should be noted that, over the last 40 years, Brazil has become 
accustomed to admitting that electricity consumption would grow more 
than the GDP. The most likely trajectory for this ratio is to tend towards 
becoming a constant value in the period under consideration.e The current 
world trend is a very slow decrease of this ratio, as can be seen in Figure 7, 
which uses data from EIA/DOE to show the evolution of electrical intensity 
in the economies of various regions of the world.
Figure 7 shows a slow convergence of the various regions toward 
the same average value. Electricity intensity in North America and 
Eurasia is falling, while in South and Central America (including Brazil) 
it is increasing. The Middle East has exceeded the world average and 
does not conform to the expected convergence. Africa, Asia and Oceania 
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have maintained their intensity, while Europe’s fell slightly, following 
the world average. This behavior reinforces the hypothesis that energy 
intensity tends to remain approximately constant over the next years.f
It must also be noted that worldwide solutions for the scarcity of 
liquid fuels rely basically on electric energy. This could refuel demand 
for electricity.
Assuming economic growth of 4% a year, the demand for 
electrical energy in 2035 should be between 1,600 and 1,700 TWh 
(terawatt/hour): it is upon this demand outlook that we will analyze the 
role of nuclear energy.
Comparative costs of electric energy generation
Several studies of comparative costs were carried out around 
the world after the recent oil crisis and in view of the greenhouse 
effect. (Arguably,) The most signiﬁcant is possibly the International 
Energy Agency’s (IEA) Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 
– 2005 Update. The methodology employed in our assessment is a 
simpliﬁcation of the one adopted in that study that enables us to easily 
evaluate changes in costs.
In conventional thermal power plants, fuel is the main cost 
component in generating electricity, whereas in nuclear plants most costs 
are ﬁxed. But when we consider expanding production (or replacing 
deactivated plants), the comparative costs of production in the plants to 
be built are of greater interest. IEA’s study considered actual plants that 
were recently built.
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Figure 7. Electricity/GDP for several regions. The ratio for Brazil 
   remains practically constant throughout the period, while the 
   world’s shows a slight decrease.
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To the assayed results (of typical power plants) were added the 
corresponding costs of CO2 emissions (which are still not taken into 
account commercially in the United States, as the country has not ratiﬁed 
the Kyoto protocol). Several measures to capture carbon emissions are 
being studied in the United States and, undoubtedly, this will become an 
important parameter in choosing fuels for generating electricity over the 
next years. Current estimates of the costs to capture CO2 emissions are 
higher than the cost of coal, US$ 100 per metric ton. The value of US$ 
30 per metric ton of CO2 is used merely as an illustration: it corresponds 
to the assessed cost for purchasing carbon credits in the terms of said 
Protocol and is the minimum amount currently under consideration. 
Table 2 shows the comparative costs for the various sources of electricity 
generation.
Table 2. Comparative costs of electricity generation in the United States.
Entry data Symbol Unit  Oil Naturalgas Coal Nuclear Diesel
Life span T Year 25 40 40 40 20
Construction & 
installation time
T Year 3 3 4 6 2
Investment I
US$/kW
(kilowatt)
1340 609 1366 1894 19000
Decommissioning cost CD US$/kW 0 0 0 269 0
Average capacity FCM
Non-
dimensional
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Interest rate J Year -1 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Decommissioning fund 
return rate
R Year -1 0 0 0 2% 0
Conversion efficiency H
Non-
dimensional
0.41 0.54 9.46 0.33 0.4
Fuel price PC US$/MWhth 25.67 24.44 4.98 1.35 28.24
Annual operations and 
maintenance cost
CAOM US$/kW.a 26 26 50 63 26
Emission of CO2 for 
US$/tCO2 emitted
30 tCO2/MWh 0.276 0.200 0.337 0.000 0.264
Cost per MWh 
(megawatt/hour)
Cost of carbon emitted CCE US$/MWh el. 20.2 11.1 22.0 0.0 19.8
Fixed
generation cost
CFG US$/MWh el. 26.9 13.5 30.2 45.0 21.3
Cost
of fuel
CC US$/MWh el 62.6 45.3 10.8 4.1 70.6
Total cost of generation CTG US$/MWh el 89.6 58.8 41.1 49.1 91.9
Total cost with CO2
emissions
CT US$/MWh el 109.7 69.9 63.0 49.1 111.7
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The results are also shown in Figure 8, where ﬁxed costs (including 
operational and maintenance costs) can be compared to fuel costs. The above 
mentioned cost of CO2 emissions is also represented.
According to the premises of this comparison, the cost of nuclear 
generation is competitive with the cost of generation from oil and natural 
gas, even if coal-generated electricity (predominant in the US) remains 
cheaper than nuclear. But the nuclear option becomes economically 
competitive when we take into account even modest costs to suppress CO2
emission. The cost analysis shown here can be taken as an approximation 
of the current European situation. It should be noted that the deactivation 
of most coal-based power plants in Western Europe was due to other 
environmental reasons that preceded concern about greenhouse effects – and, 
in countries such as the UK, it was also due to labor issues.
Figure 8. Comparative costs of generating electricity in new power 
   plants and current fuel prices in the US (2005).
A similar analysis is being undertaken for Brazil, with the peculiarity 
that most of the country’s electricity comes from hydroelectric plants. 
Thermal plants that are built will necessarily have a regulating role, seeing 
that the reservoirs that supply the hydroelectric system are slowly dwindling 
(Alvim et al, 2005). Different average capacity factors are expected for 
thermal plants; in 2005, for instance, the capacity factor of conventional 
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thermal plants was 31%; if we exclude plants from the isolated system, the 
capacity factor was only 21%.
Nuclear and coal plants should be aimed at complementing the 
thermal plants with the larger capacity factor, because they are plants with 
predominantly ﬁxed costs. Other plants will complement the Brazilian 
generation grid with lower capacity factor. Brazil has considerable potential 
for generating electricity from biomass, particularly sugarcane bagasse. This 
energy source is available during the dry season, when there is a water deﬁcit 
in plants with no adequate reservoir.
In a preliminary analysis, hydroelectric energy is still advantageous in 
terms of generation costs. However, environmental deadlocks prevent this 
potential from being fully utilized. On the other hand, future demand will 
be concentrated in the southeast and northeast of the country, where the 
hydroelectric potential (if it were fully exploited) would soon be exhausted.
The largest power plants are being planned for the Amazon region, 
where environmental difﬁculties are even greater. But it seems probable that, 
because of its economic advantages, considerable hydroelectric generation 
capacity will be installed in that region. The plants of Belo Monte and Rio 
Madeira were included in the PAC – Growth Acceleration Plan. In order to 
make the projects acceptable to society, the ﬂooded areas (and the reservoirs) 
were considerably reduced in both projects. In the case of Rio Madeira, 
there was the additional need to prevent the reservoir from overﬂowing into 
Bolivian territory, which would considerably increase the complexity of the 
undertaking.
That is, even if the estimated generation costs are lower, the 
environmental and ﬁnancial uncertainties do not allow us to expect installed 
hydroelectric capacity to be more than 180 GW (gigawatts) in 2035, out of 
an estimated total of 260 GW. That is the threshold of our upper estimate, 
including the projections of the 2030 Plan, as shown in Figure 9.
The threshold does not take into account the evolution of 
the cost of generating energy. Figure 10 shows two estimates of the 
evolution of the cost per MWh from Brazilian hydroelectric power plants 
– which, although quite different, coincide at the economic threshold 
of approximately 150 GW of installed capacity, where the cost of 
hydroelectric energy would exceed US$ 55 /MWh.
Considering a 12% rate of technical losses, the 150 GW limit  
corresponds to approximately 720 TWh of generated energy, or a ﬁnal 
consumption of 640 TW/h. In other words, if global demand in 2035 lies 
between 1,600 and 1,700 TWh, approximately 1,000 TWh will have to 
be thermal. Thermal plants would no longer have the supplementary role 
they have today and we may assume that the average capacity factor will 
have increased. If it reaches 70%, the installed thermal potential would be 
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approximately 170 GW; if we assume that 30% of this potential is nuclear, 
this would correspond to a capability of 52 GW, or approximately forty 
Angra 3-type reactors.
In the ofﬁcial planning (2030 Plan), nuclear generation capability will 
reach 7.2 GW in 2030, comprising four additional 1 GW units besides Angra 
3. If we extrapolate the 2030 Plan for another ﬁve years, we reach a total of 
10 GW generated by nuclear plants in 2035.
The main problem in the 2030 Plan seems to be related to the 
demand of natural gas, which would reach 26 billion m3 per year in that year, 
corresponding to approximately 6% of current Brazilian reserves (including 
inferred reserves). Since the generation of electricity is only one of the uses of 
natural gas (approximately 20% both in the US and in Brazil), consumption 
of natural gas in 2030 would correspond to almost 30% of current reserves in 
only one year. Brazil holds only 0.2% of the known world reserves of natural 
gas and only 0.9% of oil reserves (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
June 2005). In other words, the option of producing electricity from natural 
gas implies importing gas from neighboring countries (South and Central 
America hold 8.5% of the world reserves). This problem will be discussed 
below in the strategic analysis.
In Brazil, the cost of generating electricity from natural gas is lower 
than from nuclear sources. In 2005, the average price of natural gas per 
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Figure 9. Installed hydroelectric power in the reference scenarios of 
    the 2025 and 2030 plans, and the threshold considered 
   in this essay.
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ton of oil equivalent was half that of oil (BEN/MME – Balanço Energético 
Nacional/ Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2006). One would expect it to 
cost somewhat more than fuel oil, considering the superior characteristics 
(including environmental ones) of natural gas.
From an analysis of nuclear generation costs in the US, we can infer 
that nuclear sources tend to be competitive with natural gas if oil prices 
(which are a reference for gas prices) remain above US$ 40 per barrel. 
Inasmuch as Brazilian prices are on a par with international ones, the 
domestic outlook should also reﬂect the international one.
From a costs perspective, and if the aforementioned hypotheses of 
price evolution hold, nuclear sources tend to be competitive with other 
commercial sources in the time frame of our study.
Environmental concerns
Environmental objections to nuclear energy have lately become less 
intense. We may say that, in part, they were negatively offset by greater 
concerns with proliferation, which will be dealt with later.
The main reason for the attenuation of opposition to nuclear energy 
relates to the perception that the issue of long-lasting waste is not restricted 
to nuclear plants; it also involves thermal plants if we compute the emission 
Figure 10. Assessment of the cost of energy based on updated 
   Eletrobras and EPE investment data for socially and 
   environmentally viable plants. Generation costs calculated 
   by the authors.
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of greenhouse gases. There are no direct emissions of such gases in nuclear 
plants.
In order to have an idea of the mass and volume of the residues from 
both a nuclear and a conventional thermal plant, consider the following. 
A 1.3 GW nuclear plant (at 80% capacity) requires the replenishment of 
54 tons of fuel (enriched uranium) per year, equivalent to one third of its 
total load, which amounts to a volume of 50 m3. The generation of the 
same amount of electricity (approximately 9 TWh) would produce from 2 
to 3 million tons of CO2 per year (in a natural gas or coal plant), releasing 
a volume of 1 to 1.5 billion m3 of this gas into the atmosphere. In other 
words, there is a 1:50,000 ratio between the mass of residues from a 
nuclear and a thermal power plant.
The environmental risks of nuclear energy can be divided in four 
categories:
1 Risks from normal plant operation.
2 Risks from accidents.
3 Risks in the fuel cycle (production chain, from mine to fuel).
4 Risks in the accumulated wastes.
Firstly, normal operation of the nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) plants adopted by Brazil (current and future plants) can be 
considered relatively clean in comparison with other types of thermal 
generation plants, and there are no signiﬁcant objections to operating plants 
from local populations in Brazil and abroad.
The main worry of neighboring populations and of environmental 
analyses are the possible accidents from reactor failure and, ultimately, 
from terrorist action.
Regarding the PWRs, no accidents with signiﬁcant environmental 
damage have ever recorded. The most serious incident, at Three Mile 
Island, had no direct environmental consequences, yet led to the 
improvement of current reactors and to the considerable changes that 
are being incorporated into the next generation of reactors. The current 
perspective (International Energy Outlook 2006) is that, worldwide, 
there will be a 31% increase in nuclear energy generation between 2003 
and 2030, and that the forecast number can be exceeded in case of higher 
fuel prices and greater implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.
The greatest probability of contamination risk lies in the fuel cycle, 
especially critical accidents such as the one that occurred in the fuel plant 
of Tokaymura, Japan, in 1999. These accidents are more common in 
military plants or in those that require much greater enrichment than the 
PWRs, and usually result from breaches in safety procedures. Normally, 
they are very short-duration accidents (thermal expansion usually halts 
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the reaction), that affect the direct operators. The Tokaymura accident, 
which lasted several hours, was an exception. The site near the plant 
was affected by radiation (gamma rays and neutrons), but external 
contamination was not serious. An accident of much graver consequences 
might come from the accidental or intentional dispersion of plutonium 
from reprocessing plants. These two types of accidents are highly unlikely 
in Brazil, as the level of enrichment used here in commercial plants is 
relatively low (4%) and there are no plans for domestic fuel reprocessing 
in the next decades.
It should be noted that, as in any type of activity, such accidents 
must be compared to accidents in other fuel cycles, including coal mine 
collapses, ﬁres in oil installations and hazardous transportation of liquid 
and gaseous fuels.
In Brazil, the type of radiation dispersion of gravest concern relates 
to mining activities (not necessarily related to the nuclear cycle), where 
efﬂuents can disseminate natural radioactivity found in ores, facilitated by 
the chemical attack used to extract uranium and other materials.
In addition to insufﬁcient ﬁnancial and human resources for 
licensing and inspecting activities, Brazil’s nuclear regulatory agency, 
CNEN (National Nuclear Energy Commission), faces the peculiar 
problem of incompatible interests, being also responsible for managing 
the country’s nuclear industries [INB – Indústrias Nucleares Brasileiras]. 
This anomaly, acknowledged by CNEN’s current directors, persists in 
spite of numerous national and international recommendations against it.
Regarding low- and medium-activity waste currently stored 
in situ at the Angra plant, a deﬁnite solution must be reached before 
expansion of the Nuclear Program. The solution to this problem poses no 
technological difﬁculties; rather, it is a matter of political will and public 
acceptance.
There is, however, the greater problem of ﬁnding a deﬁnite 
repository for medium- and high-activity waste (essentially, irradiated 
fuels), the technical solution for which seems to be underground 
deposition at a place with proper geological conditions that, nevertheless, 
reserves for future (and current) generations the possibility of an eventual 
intervention. This is probably the strategy that will be implemented in the 
Yucca Mountain repository in the United States.
It is impossible to overstress that a deﬁnite repository for nuclear 
waste must be capable of containing radioactive residue for many 
thousands of years. This is a problem with which humanity has no 
experience (the time frame is longer than that of so-called civilized 
human activity) and whose solution depends on past geological behavior.
Regarding this point, the line of reactors adopted by Brazil and 
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predominantly by the world generates a lower volume of solid waste 
than its closest competitor, the natural/heavy water uranium reactors 
– PHWRs (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors). Reprocessing these fuels 
by reusing the plutonium through irradiation of mixed oxides (plutonium 
and uranium) is something that is already being done in several 
developed countries, considerably reducing the volume of high-activity 
residue to be stored (products that result from the ﬁssion of the uranium 
nucleusg and from residual plutonium). In Brazil, no decision was made 
to follow the reprocessing road, which leads us to believe that fuel storage 
will be carried out with no changes in their physical or chemical state.
Therefore, we may say that there is still no solution for nuclear 
waste (solid, small volume and highly toxic for thousands of years) 
and for the residues of other thermal plants (gaseous, high volume and 
lasting hundreds of years). In Brazil, more attention should be given to 
radioactive dispersion in mining activities. Another pressing need is to 
dissociate the CNEN from the industrial activities of the fuel cycle.
Technological Aspects
Brazil is one of the few countries that masters the nuclear fuel cycle 
– which includes mining, concentrating and purifying uranium as U3O8
(triuranium octaoxide – yellowcake), converting it into hexaﬂuoride, 
enriching it, reconverting it into an oxide (UO2 – uranium dioxide), 
manufacturing pellets and assembling the fuel rods. No commercial 
units exist for the conversion stage, and due to the enrichment capacity 
of the unit being built at INB (already in partial operation) most of the 
uranium is enriched abroad.
The development of the fuel cycle technology, promoted largely at the 
Navy and CNEN installations (with the support of several industrial units of 
the Brazilian production system) has already had considerable technological 
impact on domestic industries.
There are increasing restrictions in the world against the transfer of 
technologies directly related to the nuclear cycle and of those said to be dual-
use. The availability of such technologies has to be attained domestically 
until the doors for their importation are opened. Considering that many of 
these technologies are dual-use, an eventual refusal to develop the nuclear 
area would lead the country to abandon several high-proﬁt areas of the 
industrial sector.
In the practical experience of nations, access to these technologies 
is not obtained by renouncing nuclear activities (as the more developed 
countries wish us to believe), but by acquiring domestic capability and, to a 
lesser degree, by the transparency of the national nuclear program.
The country is capable of manufacturing the heavy elements of the 
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nuclear reactor and of the heat exchangers. However, most of the control 
elements are still imported. If electricity generationh is divided into smaller 
turbines, domestic manufacturing of these components may become possible 
over the next decades. The design of the next nuclear plants will still come 
from abroad, albeit with an increasing degree of nationalization.
Manufacturing of reactor components requires important 
technological expertise in the areas of materials and mechanical and civil 
engineering. Building a reactor enhances the expertise in managing and 
applying quality assurance procedures.
The technological development associated with the nuclear sector also 
brings important advances for the country in certain speciﬁc areas. There are 
growing access restrictions to these technologies that hamper development 
in other areas. Access to these technologies is obtained through the domestic 
mastery that emerges from needs created in the nuclear area.
Strategic Aspects
Strategically, two points should be stressed: the ﬁrst relates to 
the availability of national energy reserves and the perspective of energy 
dependency; the second involves the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and related technologies.
With regard to the ﬁrst point, Brazilian energy reserves and resources 
are published annually in the National Energy Balanço (BEM) by EPE/
MME, as summarized in Table 3 for 2005, including the reserve/production 
(r/p) and reserve/consumption (r/c) ratios.
Table 3. Reserves measured/indicated in absolute values and 
     related to production and consumption in 2005.
Reserves Production Consump-tion (1) R/P R/C
Consump-tion(2) in 
the generation of 
electricity
106 tep 106 toe/year 106 toe/year Years Years
Oil 1668 84.3 87.7 20 19 3%
Natural gas (3) 304 14.8 22.7 21 13 18%
Coal (4) 2,756 2.3 2.3 1,174 1,204 83%
Nuclear energy 1,236 1.3 2.5 944 498 100%
Source: BEN/EPE/MME Reserves on 12/31/2005 measured/indicated considering 
waste in mining and processing (in the case of coal and uranium).
(1) Includes transformation.
(2) In the case of oil, electricity generation from oil products.
(3) The production of natural gas excludes re-injection; consumption includes waste.
(4) Considered as steam coal.
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Among the non-renewable fuels, coal is the one with the greatest 
reserves and the largest reserve/production and reserve/consumption 
ratios. These ratios were obtained from the consumption of steam 
coal and do not include metallurgical coal (for which Brazil is almost 
completely dependent on imports – 10.4 million tons of oil equivalents 
in 2005). Nuclear energy – uranium – comes next, even if we adopt 
the criteria of non-utilization of the residual energies of uranium and 
plutonium in the irradiated fuels. As for natural gas, not only is Brazil 
already dependent on foreign supply, but this is the non-renewable energy 
source with the lowest reserve/consumption ratio. The generation of 
thermal electricity using preferentially natural gas, as predicted in the 
2030 Plan, will probably continue to be carried out with gas imported 
from our neighbors.
Table 4 shows the possible generation of electric energy from 
the reserves shown on the previous table. The last column indicates 
total reserves, including both inferred and estimated values. This table 
attempts do discriminate the part of the reserves that would be destined 
to electrical generation by ﬁxing tentative limits on the use of each source 
based on the percentage of use in 2005 (an increase in the share of natural 
gas used in generation was assumed).
From Table 4 we can infer that generating electricity from coal 
and nuclear sources provide greater energy independence among non-
renewable fuels. However, Brazilian coal, containing a large volume of 
ashes, is only useful for generation at the mine head, and therefore is 
restricted to plants in the southern region of the country. Furthermore, 
when we include inferred and estimated reserves, it becomes evident 
that the 2020 Plan’s option for thermal generation from natural gas is a 
strategic choice to make use of the natural resources of our neighbors, 
with whom Brazil has a privileged relationship vis-à-vis other countries 
with a demand for natural gas. The table takes into account that there 
are other uses for natural gas and that it should preferably be used to co-
generate electricity and heat, and not exclusively for generating electricity.
Table 4. Electricity generation from existing Brazilian reserves.
Measured/
indicated
reserves
For use in 
generating
electricity
Reserves
usable in 
generation
??????????
in
generating
electricity
Generation:
measured/
indicated
reserves
Generation
including
inferred/
estimated
reserves
106 tep 106 tep 106 tep TWh TWh
Oil 1,668 5% 83 0.38 32 368 505
Natural gas 304 30% 91 0.41 37 435 645
Coal 2,756 85% 2,343 0.29 679 7,900 25303
Nuclear energy 1,236 100% 1,236 0.34 420 4,888 8519
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An analysis of the reserves makes it clear that steam coal and nuclear 
sources are important generation options. The table does not include 
renewable reserves, but the production of electricity from biomass will 
become increasingly important, particularly that derived from sugarcane 
bagasse. 
Under the hypothesis that nuclear energy’s share in 2035 
would be an installed capacity of 52 GW, nuclear generation would be 
approximately 350 TWh (with a capacity factor of approximately 80%), 
and the total reserves would allow it to be maintained for 23 years. In 
the most probable scenario, with an installed capacity of 10 GW and the 
generation of 70 TWh, estimated reserves would last 110 years.
As to the second point of this strategic analysis, we must take into 
account that the issue of nuclear proliferation has changed signiﬁcantly 
over the last years:
??India and Pakistan have declared and demonstrated their ability 
to explode nuclear military artifacts.
??North Korea has conceded that its nuclear activities are for 
military uses.
??Iran has had its allegedly peaceful nuclear program contested.
??The risk of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction was used by the United States and Great Britain as a 
pretext for the invasion of Iraq, in spite of the negative results of 
UN inspections.
??The great nuclear powers have not only practically abandoned 
the previously announced policy of disarmament, but have also 
rekindled old projects such as “Star Wars”.
??Finally, a new doctrine in the United States contemplates the use 
of speciﬁc nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. This 
doctrine and the use of force against Iraq in disregard of the 
conclusions of UN inspectors (from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency – IAEA) on nuclear issues have weakened the 
best arguments on the practical uselessness of other countries 
seeking access to nuclear weapons.
In this scenario, it came as no surprise the complete failure of the 
UN Conference to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
took place in May 2005.
With regard to Brazil, which was even identiﬁed as a cause of 
concern in the area of safeguards and the “ﬂavor of the month” for 
international pressure to adhere to the Additional Protocol strengthening 
IAEA’s safeguards, the situation has also improved:
??A decision was reached with the IAEA on the methods to be 
used to inspect the Rezende enrichment plant, which will not 
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disclose the technical details Brazil wanted to protect (a camera 
allows a view from the top of the centrifuges).
??The policy of preserving Brazil’s enrichment technology was 
revealed and has been acknowledged as effective for non-
proliferation, with no disclosure of information and no 
participation of Brazilian technicians in non-peaceful projects 
abroad. 
The current oil price crisis and the problems of global warming 
associated with the greenhouse effect have led many countries to reconsider 
increasing the share of nuclear energy in their energy matrix over the next 
decades. Countries that kept their nuclear generation programs, such as 
China and Japan, have already announced their intention of intensifying 
them. Most countries chose extending the life span of existing reactors. 
Brazil seems inclined to resume the construction of Angra 3 and the 2030 
Plan includes four additional nuclear power plants.
Therefore, it is inevitable that Brazil’s (and, probably, Argentina’s) 
adherence to the Additional Protocol, ratiﬁed by the IAEA to strengthen 
nuclear safeguards, will come again under discussion. This Protocol has 
already been signed by practically every country where nuclear energy plays a 
relevant role and it does not seem possible for Brazil to delay indeﬁnitely its 
decision to adhere (or not) to it. It would be desirable to ﬁnd a less intrusive 
way to eventually apply the Additional Protocol to Brazil.
Thus, Brazil’s uranium reserves and mastery of the fuel cycle place 
the country in a privileged position regarding the use of nuclear energy. The 
world trend in non-proliferation indicates that this option will be closed to 
countries that are not able to master the technology over the next years.
Conclusions
Projected energy demand for the next 30 years, even for less-than-
desirable economic growth and taking into account efforts aimed at reducing 
energy intensity, reveals the need to add thermal energy to electricity 
generation, which today is predominantly hydroelectric. Nuclear energy 
should also have a share in generating electricity.
Overly optimistic forecasts of the reduction of the electricity intensity 
do not seem feasible in our time frame.
The cost of nuclear generation will probably remain competitive in 
a world scenario with oil prices above US$ 40 per barrel. In Brazil, nuclear 
energy should also become competitive sometime during this period.
Environmentally, nuclear energy is once again being favored due 
to the growing pressure to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. The 
storage of large quantities of carbon dioxide introduced the problem of long-
term storage of waste (previously a nuclear prerogative) to other sources of 
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energy. The mass of the residues is ﬁfty-thousand times greater than that 
from nuclear sources.
The line of reactors adopted by Brazil and the forecasted limited use 
of nuclear energy make it possible to postpone a solution to the problem of 
long-term waste disposal. The repositories for short- and medium-duration 
waste should be deﬁned over the following years. The issue of dissociating 
CNEN from the industrial activities of the fuel cycle must also be solved. 
Special care must be given to the environmental impacts of mining activities, 
even that of non-nuclear materials.
The development of nuclear technology has already brought important 
gains for the country, affecting other areas of industrial activity – which, 
in turn, drive the domestic development of technologies that suffer from 
restrictions in the importation of techniques and equipment needed for other 
sectors.
Strategically, Brazil has uranium reserves and masters the technology 
to produce fuel. This makes its supply of electric energy less vulnerable, as 
it will probably depend more strongly on imported natural gas. The policies 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have enormously restricted the 
development or importation of technology related to the fuel cycle. Brazil 
enjoys a privileged position in the development and responsible management 
of this technology and must strive to keep it active, because nuclear energy is 
certainly part of its energy future.
Notes
a This analysis can be global or by industry, as it was done here, for reasons of 
simplicity.
b The values of GDP in PPP from 1980 to 2004 show practically the same relative 
behavior of the annual GDP values in real terms. This allows us to extend to the 
concept of purchasing power parity to the 1970-1979 period and project it for 
the following years.
c The disparity between exchange rates in terms of purchasing power parity is 
a persistent reality in many countries, in spite of the economic openness that 
has been occurring. It is hoped, however, that if the process of economic 
internationalization is not reverted, this difference will disappear. Either way, the 
real value of the GDP is what should be taken into account.
d The correspondence between both scales is not precise, but the approximation 
between the values in the upper scale and the observed values is quite good.
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e In 2005, for instance, the consumption of electricity grew more that the GDP 
(surprising government planners).
f It should be noted that the change pointed out by the WWF study is equivalent 
to attaining, in 15 years, the same electricity/GDP ratio (in purchasing power 
parity) of Africa. Those who are more optimistic might say that Brazil would 
attain the level of Italy, which also has a low electricity/GDP ratio. But certainly, 
this way is not possible if the country continues to specialize in commodities. In 
any case, such a radical change in the economy of electric energy does not seem 
possible within the time frame suggested by the WWF.
g For ﬁssion products, there is also the alternative of irradiation in accelerators to 
reduce residual activity.
h In plants such as Angra 2, with only one turbine.
ABSTRACT – The perspectives of nuclear energy in Brazil is analyzed regarding 
demand, costs, environmental, technological and strategic aspects. The projected 
energy demand, even for a growth rate below the desired one and considering 
some efforts related to energy intensity reduction, shows the need of adding 
thermal energy to electricity generation, now predominantly hydraulic. Nuclear 
energy should have a share in this generation due to economical, environmental, 
technological and strategic reasons. 
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